Review of Fault Mitigation Approaches for Deep Neural Networks for Computer Vision in Autonomous Driving by Cerino, Mattia
 
ALMA MATER STUDIORUM - UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA 
 
 
SCUOLA DI INGEGNERIA  
 
DIPARTIMENTO di 
INGEGNERIA DELL’ENERGIA ELETTRICA E DELL’INFORMAZIONE  
“Guglielmo Marconi” 
DEI 
 
 
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN  
Advanced Automotive Electronic Engineering 
 
 
 
 
TESI DI LAUREA 
in 
Test, Diagnosis and Reliability 
 
 
Review of Fault Mitigation Approaches for Deep Neural 
Networks for Computer Vision in Autonomous Driving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANDIDATO                    RELATORE 
 
Mattia Cerino                  Chiar.ma Prof.ssa Cecilia Metra 
 
 
          CORRELATORI 
 
Dr. Martin Eugenio Omana 
Dr. Michael Paulitsch 
Dr. Ralf Graefe 
 
 
 
 
Anno Accademico 
2019/2020 
 
 
Sessione I 
 21/07/2020
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family and my friends 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Index 
 
 
Index…………………………………………...………………………………………3 
Introduction…….……………...…………..……………………………...…………..5 
Motivations………………….....…………………………….……………………...…6 
 
1. Chapter 1: Preliminary concepts…………..…..…………...…………….…..7 
1.1. Characterization of Autonomous Driving……………………………….8 
1.2. Review of typical Hardware Failures and Threats………………………9 
1.3. Summary of the standard ISO 26262…………………………………..11 
1.4. Introduction to Deep Neural Networks…………………………………15 
1.5. Deep Neural Networks in Safety-Critical Systems…………………….19 
2. Chapter 2: General Reliability Evaluation Framework………….………..20 
2.1. Impact of General Errors on DNNs’ Accuracy…………...……………21 
2.2. A Case Study on Bit Transitions………………………………….……23 
2.3. Reliability Tests……………………………………………..………….24 
    2.3.1.    Neutron Beam Experiments…………………………………..25 
    2.3.2.    Fault-Injection Framework………………………...…………26 
2.4. A Fault Vulnerability Evaluation Methodology……..…………………27 
2.5. Error Criticality Evaluation……………………………...……………..30 
3. Chapter 3: Permanent Faults Mitigation on Deep Neural Networks’ 
Hardware Accelerators………………………………………………….…………..32 
3.1. A Methodology for Designing Reliable AI Systems…………...………33 
3.2. Deep Neural Networks’ Accelerators and Graphic Processing Units.…35 
3.3 Error Resilience Analysis………………………………………………41 
3.4. Methodologies Reducing the Impact of Permanent Faults……………..43 
4. Chapter 4: Transient Faults Mitigation…..……………………….………..48 
4.1. General Impact of Soft Errors on Deep Neural Networks ….….………49 
4.2. General Impact of Soft Errors in Hardware Accelerators….……….….51 
4 
 
4.3. Methodologies Reducing Impact of Transient Faults on DNNs’ 
Accelerators…………………………………………………….……………………..52 
4.4. Selective Hardening on FPGA…………………………………...…….55 
4.5. Brief Observation on Aging……………………………………………59 
Conclusions…………………………………..………………………………………63 
Acknowledgements…………………………..………………………………………64 
Abbreviations……………………………..……………………….…………………65 
Bibliography………………...……………..…………………………………………67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Recently, the development of technology has led to a widespread usage 
of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in autonomous systems, in particular in 
safety-critical autonomous cyber-physical systems. One of the key beneficiaries 
is Autonomous Driving. Nowadays, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are the 
trending state-of-the-art ML algorithms for most of the Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) applications. Computer vision is crucial to guarantee autonomous control, 
and DNNs promise to perform tasks as object detection, classification and 
localization with particularly high correctness. Nevertheless, the automotive 
industry has always been a competitive market in terms of strict safety 
requirements for both hardware and software designers. One purpose of 
Autonomous Driving is to exclude the human role on vehicle control. 
Therefore, it is essential to guarantee high reliability: developing a robust 
DNN algorithm represents only a single side of the problem. The other side is 
the safety and reliability of the underlying hardware architecture: DNNs have 
an high non-linear nature, hence their decision bounds are not precise. Thus, 
hardware-level faults represent a substantial problem for DNNs implementation 
as they might expose to risk the entire system safety by leading to unforeseen 
network decisions. 
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Motivation 
 
 
The aim of this work is to identify and present challenges and risks 
related to the employment of DNNs in Computer Vision for Autonomous 
Driving. Nowadays one of the major technological challenges is to choose the 
right technology among the abundance that is available on the market. 
Specifically, here it is collected a synopsis of the state-of-the-art 
architectures, techniques and methodologies adopted for building fault-tolerant 
hardware and ensuring robustness in DNNs-based Computer Vision 
applications for Autonomous Driving. 
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Chapter 1 
Preliminary Concepts 
 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis work there will be a brief description of the 
most common characterization of the autonomous driving, a review of the 
typical hardware failures and threats, a summary of the main standard (ISO 
26262) that rules the reliability of Autonomous Driving, and an introduction to 
Deep Neural Networks and their application on safety-critical systems. 
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1.1. Characterization of Autonomous Driving 
 
In the SAE International’s standard J3016: Taxonomy and Definitions for 
Terms Related to On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems [1] six 
levels of driving automation are identified. This is done in order to provide a 
common taxonomy to make simpler communication and collaboration between 
technicians.  
 
Figure 1.1. Levels of driving automation [1] 
 
A key demarcation line can be drawn between level 2 and level 3: considering 
levels from 0 to 2 the human driver is in charge of monitoring the driving 
environment, while from level 3 to 5, it is the automated driving system the 
actual responsible of performing the entire dynamic driving task. It is worth 
noting that a specific vehicle under consideration can be provided by multiple 
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features, and depending on the number of features that are activated it could 
operate at different levels. These levels are summarized in a table, shown in 
figure 1.2: 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Description of levels of driving automation [1] 
 
 
1.2. Review of typical Hardware Failures and Threats 
 
In literature, the main idea behind dealing with failures, is not to target physical 
defects, but to classify them by the effect they have on the circuitry behaviour: 
this approach is known as finding and describing Fault Models. This strategy is 
crucial in testing and in diagnosis, but also in an approach called Fault 
Tolerance. The last one is referring to guarantee the correctness of operations 
of systems in the field, meaning that systems must be able to detect eventual 
faults and then to mask them or correct them as fast as possible. Depending on 
the target system, the consequences of a fault can be catastrophic or not. 
Autonomous Driving, which is the topic of this work, is a very important 
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example of safety critical application, with high dependability needs. 
Dependability is a global concept including Reliability, Availability, Safety 
and Security. The fundamental concept characterizing the Fault Tolerance 
approach is the fact that the design of products is reinvented in order to tolerate 
faults in the field: this is as successful as the designer is able to predict the kind 
of faults that can happen in the field. Therefore, it is very important to have 
available accurate and extensible fault models. Between traditional hardware 
fault tolerance techniques, it is possible to mention Modular Redundancy, 
Online Testing and Recovery and, specifically for memories, Error Correcting 
Codes.  
Coming to the most common threats and hardware failures, they can be 
classified as hazards, potential sources of harm caused by malfunctioning 
behaviour of one circuit. It is worth noting the following ones: 
• Permanent faults: faults that are always present from the moment in 
which they appear. Examples of these are transistor stuck-at, transistor 
stuck-on, transistor stuck-open, resistive bridging faults, crosstalk faults. 
Faults of this kind can be generated by Process Variations, meaning that 
there are imperfections in the chip fabrication process, and also by 
Aging, so degradation in circuit’s characteristics over time.  
• Transient faults: faults that are only temporarily present, then the 
system goes back to its correct operation. Faults of this kind are usually 
generated by external environmental events, like high energy particle 
strikes (cosmic rays producing energetic neutrons or alpha particles 
coming from package decay) or electromagnetic interferences. Also 
temperature of operation has a role in this context. The consequence of 
this class of faults are the so-called Soft Errors, that are basically 
transient bit flips. 
• Intermittent faults: faults that are only sometimes present, an example 
are the ones due to external vibrations. 
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One of the key purpose of fault tolerance is to achieve a sufficiently high fault 
coverage with respect to the considered fault models, and to keep fault models 
considering a wide scope of possible failures. 
 
1.3. Summary of the standard ISO 26262 
 
Reliability study and its assessment is structured by different standards, released 
referring to different application domains. 
ISO 26262: Functional Safety – Road Vehicles has been the main standard 
regarding Functional Safety in the automotive domain since 2011, when its first 
edition was published. Its purpose was to address specific safety requirements 
of Electrical and Electronic (E/E) systems embedded in road vehicles. It is a 
general standard: it is oriented to the whole safety lifecycle of systems’ 
development. Indeed, functional safety features are part of each automotive 
product’s development phase: specification, design, implementation, 
integration, verification, validation and product release. ISO 26262 does not 
address the nominal performance of E/E systems; it is about the possible 
hazards caused by malfunctioning behaviour of E/E safety-related systems. 
First, there is an identification of safety goals aiming to detect and moderate the 
effect of hazards, then as a consequence of these goals some requirements for 
the final architecture, in terms of both hardware and software, are listed. 
Nowadays it is applied the second version of this standard. In the standard 
functional safety is defined as “The absence of unreasonable risk due to any 
potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning behavior of electrical and or 
electronic systems” [2]. Then safety is instead defined as “The absence of 
unreasonable risk due to any potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning 
behavior of electrical and or electronic systems” [2]. In the standard there is 
also a portion (Part 2) regarding the Functional Safety Management, which 
discusses the activities to be completed during the safety lifecycle with annexed 
requirements. In the third part, there is a categorization of the potential hazards, 
that is done by the identification of three aspects: severity (importance of 
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consequences), probability of exposure (of the driver to the risky situation) and 
controllability (evaluated as action taken by a driver, it is the capability to avoid 
unsafe events). At the end of this, it is possible to do a classification, assigning 
to different hazards a certain level called Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
(ASIL). Everything is summarized in the table of figure 1.3. To properly read it, 
it is worth noting that the three aspects under investigation are evaluated as 
follows: 
• Severity: between S1 (light and moderate injures) and S3 (fatal injuries); 
• Probability of exposure: between E1 (very low probability) and E4 (high 
probability); 
• Controllability: between C1 (simply controllable) and C3 (difficult to 
control or uncontrollable)   
As a result, there is the definition of four ASILs: 
• From ASIL A (the lowest safety integrity level) to ASIL D (the strictest 
safety integrity level). 
It is possible to notice that there is also another label, QM, that stands for 
Quality Management, which is there to represent the cases in which there is no 
requirement in accordance with ISO 26262. Anyway, for other kind of 
requirements in fields of Durability, Quality, Reliability etc., those situations 
should be considered. 
 
Figure 1.3. ASIL Determination [2] 
13 
 
 
The same typology of levels (ASILs) is assigned also to the safety goals, which 
are expressed to avoid or moderate the effect of an hazard. Finally, as a 
consequence, from safety goals, safety requirements are stated, and then they 
inherit the corresponding ASIL level. 
The product development is directed by the Technical Safety Concept, that is 
locating the requirements in a precise way to the system components (hardware 
and software). When the final product is ready, to be compliant with the 
standard it is needed to pass a Safety Validation step, in which each requirement 
is verified. The whole process can be summarized in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Flow of identifying hazards to creating functional safety requirements [3] 
 
 
The portion of the standard which is of particular interest of this thesis work, is 
the one regarding the technical safety concepts in the hardware development. It 
is well summarized in the article by Jung et al. [4]. Every level of ASILs is 
characterized by its own procedures regarding items development. Technical 
specifications about hardware compliance are based on some metrics that relate 
an hardware element with respect to its failure modes. The analysis specified by 
the standard is referred to random hardware failures affecting E/E parts. The 
neglection of systematic failures is done supposing they are detected and treated 
during initial tests. 
To define and evaluate the hardware architectural metrics, it is needed a list 
with precise definitions of failure modes. Figure 1.5 is summarizing them. 
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Figure 1.5. “Failure modes classification of a hardware element” [4] 
 
Jung et al. in [4] report the following definitions from the standard: 
• “Safe fault: fault whose occurrence will not significantly increase the 
probability of violation of a safety goal” [4] 
• “Multiple point fault: one fault or several independent faults that in 
combination, leads to a multiple point failure (either perceived, detected 
or latent) 
- Perceived: This fault is deduced by the driver without detection 
by a safety mechanism within a prescribed time. 
- Detected: This fault is detected by a safety mechanism to prevent 
the fault from being latent within a prescribed time. 
- Latent: This fault is neither detected by a safety mechanism nor 
perceived by the driver.” [4] 
• “Single point fault: fault in an element which is not covered by a safety 
mechanism and where the fault leads directly to the violation of a safety 
goal” [4] 
• “Residual fault: portion of a fault which by itself leads to the violation 
of a safety goal, occurring in a hardware element, where that portion of 
the fault is not covered by existing safety mechanisms” [4] 
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For each of these definitions it is possible to evaluate the corresponding failure 
rate. Given these characterizations, the procedure described by the standard 
concerns the evaluation of two specific metrics: the Single Point Faults Metric 
(SPFM) and the Latent Faults Metric (LFM). These systems of measurement 
are representing, respectively, the robustness of the element under consideration 
to single point faults and to latent faults. This robustness is guaranteed either by 
safety mechanisms of by design. 
There is another important metric to take into account, called the Probability of 
Dangerous Failure per Hour (PFH). The Failures in Time metric (FIT) 
metric is obtained in this way: 1 FIT corresponds to a value of 10-9 of PHF. 
Kafka in [5] describes also the way to evaluate the mentioned metrics. What is 
important for this thesis work, is their relationship with the ASIL levels, and 
this connexion is clear from the figure 1.6: 
 
Figure 1.6. “Target values of SPFM, LFM, PFH dependant from ASIL A, B, C, D” [5] 
 
 
1.4. Introduction to Deep Neural Networks 
 
Based on Machine Learning (ML) and historical data, Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) consists in implementing and deploying algorithms for machines to solve 
and act on problems by themselves. Deep Learning is one of ML methods 
whose purpose is to extract features from data. Neural Networks were 
mentioned for the first time in the 1940s [6], with the purpose to emulate the 
human brain system to find the solution to general learning problems. In the 
1980s and 1990s this methodology was sufficiently common. Nonetheless, it 
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experimented a decline basically due to the lack of computational power. Then, 
since 2006, Deep Learning has become widespread, thanks to the comparison in 
the market of some large-scale annotated data, to fast progress in designing of 
systems able to provide high computational power also exploiting parallelism 
(i.e. GPU). Moreover, some problems were more acceptably handled, like the 
management of a good initialization and the reduction of overfitting. 
Furthermore, with the advent of DNNs, it was possible to obtain better results 
thanks to their deeper architectures: using an augmented and larger amount of 
layers they started to be able to capture higher levels of patterns and this can be 
translated in the ability to learn more complex features.  
A Deep Neural Network is usually made by different layers. Commonly, it is 
composed by an input layer, followed by multiple intermediate layers (named 
hidden layers) and an output layer. Each layer transforms the data to create a 
new representation (in a hyperplane) and processes each complexity in turn. In 
each layer there is a certain number of nodes (artificial neurons), each node has 
an activation function, which is a non-linear function (i.e. max[0, value]) of a 
weighted sum of the inputs. Depending on the number of mutual connections 
between nodes, layers can belong to different types. The activation functions 
are the way in which learning happens: it is necessary that they are non-linear to 
guarantee the learning process. There exist a lot of different types of activation 
functions. One common weakness of Neural Networks in general is that they 
can’t be explained, so we can consider them fully a black box: this happens 
mostly because of the non-linearity which is present thanks to the activation 
functions. 
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Figure 1.7. An example of a DNN Architecture from [7] 
 
Going into details and referring to figure 1.7, it is possible to briefly describe 
the operation of a DNN. The learning knowledge is situated in weights and 
biases of neurons.  
 
Where: 
• Wj is the general weight vector; 
• Xi is the input vector of features; 
• Wj · Xi is the inner product between weights and inputs; 
• bj is the bias of each layer; 
• g(x) is the activation function; 
• ti is the output vector; 
• N is the number of layers. 
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To determine weights there are basically two phases: Training and Validation. 
Briefly, in the first phase, thanks to a training dataset, weights are evaluated. 
Then in the Validation phase, with a disjoint dataset the model is checked. Then 
if it is sufficiently convincing, the model is considered ready to be put into 
operation: this phase is called inference. DNNs, as just described, have a 
particularly parallel structure. To perform efficiently their typical kind of 
processing they are needed high computational capabilities, due mainly to the 
increased number of filter, neurons and parameters adopted, to provide a 
significant improvement in performances. 
DNNs have found suitable for computer vision tasks. During the years, thanks 
to the lowered price of expensive processing hardware, to the growing 
processing capabilities and to the increasing amount of data that is started to 
appear online, it was possible to use DNNs with larger data sets and in real-life 
scenarios as Autonomous Driving. 
It is possible to notice the hierarchical structure of layers in modern DNNs. One 
branch of DNNs that are actually deployed into self-driving cars, are 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN): in this particular type of network the 
first computation happens in convolutional layers (that are a certain number, 
from 3 to few tens), performing multi-dimensional convolution calculations. 
These layers are in charge to apply a filter to obtain the main features present at 
the input and to describe a feature map. Usually, there is a certain number of 
fully connected layers, that are dedicated to classification purposes. These kind 
of layers can be of Pooling type, extracting the local maximum value to be 
forwarded, or of Normalization type, averaging the inputs. 
Concerning Computer Vision, the problem to which this work is oriented is 
Object Detection and Localization. So, the aim is, starting from data collection 
coming from sensors (mostly cameras), to assess where and what kind of 
objects are present in a certain image. Current algorithms are able to provide 
bounding boxes around objects that are detected and to deliver also the so called 
Confidence Score, assessing the probability with which the detected object 
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belongs to the provided category. Then, based on the results of Object Detection 
and Localization, path decisions are taken. 
 
1.5. Deep Neural Networks in Safety-Critical Systems 
 
A critical requirement for Safety-Critical systems based on DNNs’ learning is 
the estimation of how much trust should be put in DNNs’ output. Definitely, in 
applications like Autonomous Driving, even a single misprediction can have 
catastrophic consequences. Henne et al. in [8], present a Benchmark Analysis of 
Estimation Methods. They assert that it is very important to minimize the 
amount of mistakes made by such systems, and one way to do so is to improve 
performances, in terms of accuracy, as much as possible. The other side of the 
medal is that it is needed a certain degree of awareness concerning the 
reliability of the provided outputs: mistakes and errors can lead the system to 
different kinds of scenarios, with different criticality in terms of consequences.  
Regrettably, the standard method to evaluate the confidence when dealing with 
DNNs is based on the outcome of a typical final layer, called SoftMax, which is 
providing the class to which the detected object belongs and a so-called 
confidence score. This score is usually read as a posterior probability, providing 
a relative mark of the considered output with respect to all the other outputs that 
are being produced. So, the confidence score cannot be considered as reliability 
score, and this is one of the big challenges of this field. The problem is that the 
SoftMax score tends to give an overconfidence. This is particularly true in two 
cases: 
• Out-of-Distribution (OOD): When the input is not very similar to the 
training data. Out-of-Distribution Detection is a kind of analysis which 
aims to minimize the misclassifications in outputs given by a DNN. This 
analysis’ purpose is to try to find kinds of data that in some 
circumstances can be at the input of the network and are hardly different 
with respect to the ones on which the network was trained on. 
• Adversarial example: When the input is crafted to attack the network.  
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Chapter 2 
General Reliability Evaluation Framework 
 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis work there will be a brief analysis of the 
impact of general errors on the classification accuracy of the inference phase of 
Deep Neural Networks, followed by a case study highlighting the fact that each 
system should be completely characterized to be safely put into operation. Then 
there will be a description of the most common reliability tests, and finally 
evaluation of criticality of errors happening in Deep Neural Networks 
execution. 
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2.1. Impact of General Errors on DNNs’ Accuracy 
 
Ozen and Orailoglu in [9] present an experimental analysis regarding the impact 
of general errors, assumed being bit flips during the computation of the 
activation functions or mistakes affecting weights and bias. The purpose is 
simply to show the importance of the topic because of the fact that human lives 
are involved. 
 
Figure 2.1. “The error impact on the DNN accuracy” [9] 
 
 
From the results shown in figure 2.1, it is possible to infer the existence of a 
threshold for the error rate: when it is exceeded, it occurs a high degradation of 
the accuracy and therefore it is very likely to violate safety critical constraints. 
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Moreover, errors affecting weights and bias are more dangerous because of the 
practise of reuse of these values, consequently leading to an increased error 
probability. 
A popular structure adopted to perform the typical computation of neural 
networks is a Systolic Architecture, made by a set of interconnected processing 
elements. In the case of DNNs, each processing element is only in charge to 
perform a multiply and accumulation (MAC) operation. A detailed description 
of the mentioned architecture will be outlined in Chapter 3. Concerning the 
impact of stuck-at faults, in [10], it is evaluated their impact on classification 
accuracy. In the analysis Zhang et al. focused only data-path faults since it was 
representing a significant fraction of the whole chip. Errors in memories are not 
taken into account because of the fact that they can be corrected, most of the 
times, thanks to the adoption of suitable Error Correcting Codes.  
 
Figure 2.2. “Classification Accuracy Drop Due to Stuck-at-Fault MACs.” [10] 
 
In figure 2.2 are presented the results of the analysis of the impact of simulated 
stuck-at faults on classification accuracy: it is worth noting that even with little 
MACs affected there is a considerable drop in the accuracy.  
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2.2. A Case Study on Bit Transitions 
 
Hanif et al. in [11] present a case study highlighting the fact that each system 
should be completely characterized to be safely put into operation. It regards 
one singular aspect: they distinguish the faults only in two kinds: transition of a 
bit value from 1 to 0 and the opposite case. In this investigation it is set a 
simulation in which there are memory faults, affecting network’s parameters. 
The structure considered is shown in figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3. “Experimental setup for illustrating the impact of memory faults in DNN 
execution.” [11] 
 
To represent both weights and inputs, it is assumed also to use a 32-bit floating 
point precision, whose structure is shown in the figure 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. “Single precision floating point storage format used in our DNN design.” [11] 
 
In this study, to mark the difference of the impact of the bit flip when it happens 
in different locations in the word, the injection of faults is done separately and 
analyzing the impact of the failure of one bit at a time. The outcomes of this 
analysis are exhibited in figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5. Impact of bit flip errors, distinguishing different transitions [11] 
 
They performed a thousand of tests to compute this accuracy. The first outcome 
is that the impact of any kind of fault drops as the bit significance goes down. 
The second one is obtained comparing the impact of transitions: the bit flips 
from 0 to 1 have a drastic effect on the accuracy of the network if related to bit 
flips from 1 to 0. The reason in this particular case of the denoted behaviour is 
that when it happens a 0 to 1 transition in an exponent bit, the result is a large 
growth of the output, and this mismatch results in a misclassification. 
The aforementioned case study reveals one kind of analysis that is possible to 
do to better characterize the consequences of different kinds of faults in a 
specific application.  
 
2.3. Reliability Tests 
 
Reliability tests are mainly implemented through the so-called fault-injection 
campaigns. In general, these operations require a huge number of simulations 
and therefore they are often expensive in terms of time and energy 
consumption. 
In literature there exist two main categories of fault injection techniques: 
• Hardware-based techniques: in this case faults are directly injected in 
the target hardware; hence these methods are more realistic and are able 
to provide true-to-life results. 
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• Software-based techniques: here hardware faults are simulated at an 
abstract level; they are able to provide sufficient accuracy and in general 
they are cheaper with respect to the previous ones. 
 
2.3.1. Neutron Beam Experiments 
 
The first methodology to test the reliability, mentioned by Dos Santos et al. in 
[12], is related to neutron beam experiments. The purpose of this experiments is 
to characterize the behaviour of the chip with respect to soft errors. 
The whole device under test is irradiated with a controlled neutron beam, hence 
in a realistic way every kind of fault can arise. Conceiving this class of 
experiments, it must be taken into account the conventional assumption that is 
always made when dealing with high reliability in the field: Faults occur one at 
a time (instant by instant). Typically, the neutron flux used in this kind of 
experiments is 5-10 orders of magnitude higher with respect to the actual 
(terrestrial) one at the sea level. This detail allows the characterization of 
periods of time that are much longer with respect to the periods in which the 
chip under test will be employed in reality. 
For this kind of reliability characterization, it is needed a golden (fault-free) 
evaluation of each output and a comparison with the output of the device under 
test. Whenever a discrepancy is found, the situation is underlined as altered by a 
Silent Data Corruption (SDC). 
There exists another kind of error that can happen and it is called Detected 
Uncoverable Error (DUE). As described by their name, these errors can be 
discovered by hardware or software means, but it is impossible to correct them. 
An example of DUE is a crash of the program. During neutron beam 
experiments it is possible to insert watchdogs with the aim to find DUEs. At the 
end of the experiment there is a post-processing phase in which outcomes are 
translated in a standard way, measuring the Failures In Time (FIT) rate, as 
stated by the standard ISO 26262. 
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2.3.2. Fault-Injection Framework 
 
One limitation of neutron beam methodology is that the effective detection of a 
fault happens only in the case it is shown at output. So the fault propagation 
process is not clearly observed. To analyze this other particular case, there 
exists another kind of experiment called fault-injection, mentioned by Dos 
Santos et al. in [12]. It is software-based and there exist many open source 
programs performing properly this task. 
The idea is to put in a casually chosen register a random value, in a randomly 
picked moment. The choice of where to inject the fault can be done based on an 
uniform distribution, considering the number of bits used to represent weights 
or values, as proposed by Neggaz et al. in [13]. To better emulate hardware 
faults propagation, random values are injected at low level: transient faults may 
result in a bit flip that, if propagated to memory, can cause the storage of a 
wrong value. 
Bosio et al. in [14] use a Fault Injection Framework to study the impact of 
permanent faults, that can easily be generalized to each kind of fault whose 
effect is to determine a bit flip. They consider a context in which the fault 
location is defined punctually by a field called Flo in which they are specified 
in turn the correspondent faulty layer, the edge connecting the faulty node to 
that layer, the faulty bit in the weight representation and the polarity of the 
stuck-at. A pseudocode representing the injection is presented in figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6. “Fault Injection Pseudo-Code” [14] 
At the beginning there is a golden evaluation of the faulty-free network and, 
after that, the fault injection process is induced. Actually a list of locations 
where to inject the fault is provided, then for each component of this list an 
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execution of the faulty resulting network is run and the result is compared with 
the faulty-free one. After this step, it is possible to make a classification of 
errors, and it is possible to identify a masked phenomenon as a situation in 
which there is no difference between the golden prediction and the faulty one. 
In case of a difference, Bosio et al. in [14], decided to consider as a safe error 
an error in which the confidence score of the mainly detected element is within 
a variation of ± 5% with respect to the golden prediction. Otherwise, it is an 
unsafe error.  
 
2.4. A Fault Vulnerability Evaluation Methodology 
 
Lotfi et al. in [15] introduce an interesting parameter-based Fault 
Vulnerability Evaluation Methodology, based on the assumption of using a 
Neural Network that provides a confidence score for the detected bounding 
boxes using logistic regression. It can be easily extended to Neural Networks 
using other methods to determine the confidence score of the boxes. As it is 
possible to see in Figure 2.7, it is assumed to have the possibility of running in 
parallel, receiving the same inputs, a Golden Network – Fault free and a Faulty 
Network, in which it is simulated the arising of a fault. 
 
 
Figure 2.7. "Evaluating the impact of faults on the inference object detection network 
accelerated by GPUs” [15] 
 
 
• In this process there is a bit of post processing done in order to adjust the 
output of both networks to better provide an evaluation. The first step aims 
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to get rid of the bounding boxes having a confidence lower than a threshold, 
to be properly set. 
• The second step is dedicated to merge bounding boxes that are discovered to 
represent the same object in the same region: it is defined a metric called 
Intersection over Union (IoU): it is the ratio between the intersection area of 
two different boxes, over the union area. The nearer is the value of IoU to 
the unit value, the better is the overlap between the two boxes taken into 
consideration. Again, in this case there is the need to set another threshold to 
decide whether to merge or not the two bounding boxes under investigation. 
Later the confidence scores of the two boxes are summed, and if this value 
is higher than a third specific threshold (as usual, to be properly established), 
then that cluster of bounding boxes is picked as a detected object in the final 
set. 
• The rest of bounding boxes not passing the thresholds-analysis are discarded 
and not presented at the output. 
This is the moment at which happens the comparison between the bounding 
boxes of the object revealed by the two networks. It is considered the overlap 
ratio, evaluated reusing the aforementioned metric (IoU): a fourth threshold 
value is set and based on it, a decision is made. The decision process is shown 
in Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.8. “Comparison outcomes for faulty and golden objection detection networks (bbox 
stands for bounding box)” [15] 
 
The authors introduce basically three possible scenarios: 
1. Masked: It happens when the IoU ratio is higher than the threshold. In 
this case the error has no effect on the network output, the object is 
correctly detected and classified and therefore it is a safe scenario. 
2. Silent Data Corruption (SDC): It happens in the case in which the IoU 
is lower than the threshold. Here the fault succeeded in generating an 
error that is translated into an incorrect output. 
3. Inclusion: This is an intermediary situation, in which the IoU ratio is 
lower than the threshold but the faulty network at the end detects and 
classifies the correct object. This scenario can be classified either as safe 
or SDC: the trajectory planner in the autonomous vehicle can either 
avoid the obstacles or react in advance or with a certain delay. 
Now, given the fact that this discussion is dealing with a strong safety critical 
application in which human lives are involved, the inclusion case should be 
included in the unsafe scenario. Some examples are shown in Figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9. “Examples of fault effect on the output of object detection network” [15] 
 
This methodology, anyway, is strongly dependent on parameters, that should be 
properly set. 
 
2.5. Error Criticality Evaluation 
 
Dos Santos et al. in [12] describe an interesting classification of errors, based 
on the evidence that errors are not all equal. Indeed, certain output errors can be 
considered as tolerable if the predicted object’s classification and localization 
are adequately close to the fault-free output, that in this case is represented by 
the environment around the autonomous vehicle. The fundamental idea behind 
this classification is to combine metrics already known, characterizing the 
behaviour of Deep Neural Networks: 
 
Precision, or positive predictive value is the ratio between the number of True 
Positives (TP), that are objects correctly detected and classified, and the sum of 
TP and FP, where FP stands for False Positives, representing the number of 
objects incorrectly detected (assuming that a fault-free DNN is never giving a 
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FP as an output). Precision is the fraction of relevant instances among the 
retrieved instances and it indicates the amount of selected objects that are 
relevant. If the precision score is 100%, it means that all the detections made by 
the classifier are correct. 
 
Recall is defined as the ratio between the number of True Positives (TP) and the 
sum of TP and FN, where FN stands for False Negatives, representing the 
number of objects that are present but not detected.  Recall is the fraction of the 
total amount of relevant instances that were actually retrieved and it indicates 
the quantity of relevant items that are selected. If the recall score is 100%, it 
means that all the objects in the environment were perfectly classified. 
Based on a combination of the two metrics just mentioned, Dos Santos et al. in 
[12] separate errors in two classes: non critical errors and critical errors. 
• The first class is the one labelled as non critical error, and it is 
characterized by the following conditions: Precision higher than 90% 
and Recall equal to 100%. The strict condition on Recall means that 
every object in the environment is actually detected, but the relaxed 
condition on the Precision value means that it is possible that an object 
could be incorrectly classified. 
• The second class is categorized as critical errors, and it is denoted by 
the subsequent circumstances:  Precision lower than 90% and Recall 
different from 100%. Thanks to the first circumstance there is an amount 
of non-existing objects identified and this can lead the autonomous 
vehicle to make superfluous stops. Moreover, the fact that the Recall is 
not perfect means that there exist real objects which are not seen by the 
vehicle and this can produce accidents. 
Another important observation that can be done, as considered by Neggaz et al. 
in [13], is to distinguish the critical impact that a fault brings if it affects values 
or weights that are going to be wrongly stored in memory and the lighter effect 
of a fault affecting a combinational evaluation which is only made once. 
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Chapter 3 
Permanent Faults Mitigation on Deep Neural 
Networks’ Hardware Accelerators 
 
In the third chapter of this thesis work there will be a description of some 
innovative techniques to mitigate the impact of permanent faults (stuck-at) 
generally in Hardware Accelerators. These methods regard the post-
manufacturing phase. The structure of the chapter is the following: at the 
beginning there is a summary of a general methodology, then an error resilience 
analysis and finally some specific methods are detailed. 
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3.1. A Methodology for Designing Reliable AI Systems 
 
Henne et al. in [8] show a perception chain dedicated for an autonomous 
driving system. Here it is possible to see implemented a countermeasure to 
include a possibly unreliable DNNs’ based Computer Vision algorithm, into an 
autonomous vehicle. The core idea is to delineate borders of the unreliable part 
in a box called safety-envelop. An example is shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. “Concept overview for utilizing uncertainty information of modular perception 
stages for dynamic dependability management” [8] 
In each step of the perception, it is involved the use of a certain kind of DNN. 
There are basically two outcomes after each stage: a first one that is directed to 
the next step for further processing and a second one assessing its reliability, 
which is sent to a runtime monitor. Then online decisions regarding which 
information to trust are taken and in case of a decision to not trust that 
information, the Artificial Intelligence part is excluded and it is activated a 
Low-Performance safe path taking the overall system in a safe scenario.  
Hanif et al. in [11] propose a general approach thanks to which it is possible to 
deal with design of resilient and reliable systems running machine learning and 
artificial intelligence applications. The procedures are divided in two big 
categories: Design-Time and Run-Time, and are described in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. “Methodology for designing reliable systems for ML applications” [11] 
 
The core problem in design time is to define an high reliable error-resilient 
Deep Neural Network Accelerator. It is strictly oriented to the kind of networks 
that will run on it. It is rendered an error resilience analysis focused on 
modelling the robustness of the network. Then from the outcomes of this 
analysis, together with design constraints a zero-accelerator is designed. Later 
they suggest adding additional circuitry to provide support for run-time 
reliability (i.e. timing error detection and mitigation circuitry). Finally the 
accelerator is developed, using a Reliability Aware-Synthesis technique. For 
what concerns reliability of memories, Error Correction Code (ECC)-based 
practices can be adopted and they can be really effective. The authors here do 
not recommend the use of redundancy because of the significant overhead 
introduced and since each element added is hungry of resources. 
A detail which is included in this methodology is the fact that the outcome 
structure can sustain instruction-level redundancy or partial hardening of critical 
hardware modules. 
Regarding the run-time methods here are suggested basically two approaches: 
• Fault-aware mapping of the networks: It is needed a post-production 
permanent-faults identification, whose outcomes are intersected with the 
ones of the aforementioned error resilience analysis to apply a fault-
aware mapping of the networks. This approach is exploiting the error 
35 
 
resilience analysis for offering as considerable performance and 
resource benefits as feasible. 
• Adaptive voltage and frequency scaling: Approach based on a 
monitoring of soft/timing errors, trying to guarantee reliability trading 
off with performance and energy efficiency. This can be achieved 
applying adaptive voltage and frequency scaling. If required, it is 
possible to add Software redundancy.  
 
3.2. Deep Neural Networks’ Accelerators and Graphic 
Processing Units 
 
It has already been discussed about the fact that DNN-based inference 
applications need a significant amount of computational power to be efficiently 
run. One possibility is to use a certain kind of accelerator. The first one that this 
analysis is taking into account is a Graphic Processing Unit (GPU). Indeed it is 
a family of architectures well-suited to improve the performances of such 
DNNs because those chips offer a good leverage of data and an efficient thread-
parallelism, necessary for the kind of operations they have to perform, that as 
mentioned are multiplications and accumulations. GPUs are one of the enabling 
technologies to allow object detection and classification in the Autonomous 
Driving applications, since they can offer high-throughput computational 
performances. There is the need to assess the vulnerability to hardware faults to 
ensure that the safety requirements imposed by the standard ISO 26262 are 
fulfilled. The investigation is based on the evidence that any kind of fault 
arising in the GPU hardware may result in a failure in the network running on 
top of it, which on turn may cause an infringement of a safety requirement. 
The basic internal structure of GPUs is shown in figure 3.3. It is possible to see 
that internally there is a partition into blocks called streaming multiprocessors 
(SM). Each of these cells is a computing unit that can run different threads in 
parallel, but each one owns dedicated memory cells. Then to schedule these 
threads it is needed only a simple control unit, since each thread can count on a 
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dedicated memory and so the sharing of complex resources is avoided. 
Moreover, to reduce latency, threads are not interacting with each other. 
 
Figure 3.3. “Simplified internal structures of a GPU.” [16] 
 
Since GPUs were originally designed for non-safety-critical applications like 
the ones related to entertainment or video/image editing products, they may 
result particularly susceptible to transient errors [16]. Moreover, given their 
massively parallel structure and thus their need to sustain a considerable 
number of parallel processes, in the GPU there are large caches and register 
files, very vulnerable to transient faults. 
The acceleration based on GPUs is only one way to reduce the computational 
load due to the presence of DNNs. Actually, there exists an increasing interest 
of the market in designing special purpose hardware accelerators in order to 
obtain better performances and simultaneously to be energy efficient.  
There exists a list of properties that are common to all the DNNs computation, 
that can be exploited in the design of DNN Accelerators: 
• The dependency between each computation is not strong: different 
operations can be executed in parallel; 
• There is a strong dependency between used data: the reuse can be 
strategically adopted. 
An accelerator involves basically a series of processing elements, like MACs, 
and a global buffer. Then it should be connected to a memory from which 
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transfer the data, like a DRAM, and a CPU usually performing scheduling and 
basically off-loading tasks from the accelerator. 
A first point that should be taken into account is the difference between faults 
that can propagate in different ways: the ones affecting the datapath, that can 
only happen once, differently with respect to the ones in the buffer, that instead 
can be scanned multiple times because of the reuse. 
Nowadays, almost all the training phase is made with floating point operations, 
and this is one reason because of the fact that the employment of GPUs has 
been so widespread. Then it is made a step called quantization, converting 
floating point numbers into relatively-small-precision integers (usually just 
made of 8 bits), because they are considered well-suited for an acceptable level 
of accuracy in inference [17]. This choice is improving energy consumption and 
area requirements. 
Jouppi et al. in [17] propose an architecture of a DNN hardware accelerator 
called Tensor Processing Unit (TPU). It is employed mostly in Google 
Datacenters to accelerate the inference phase of some algorithms of Neural 
Networks. Since this chip is designed to be only an accelerator, it is more like a 
coprocessor, it needs the cooperation of a complete processor. For the purposes 
of this work, it is provided a brief description of the structure of this 
architecture. 
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Figure 3.4. TPU Block Diagram [17] 
 
In Figure 3.4 it is presented the block diagram. For the purposes of this work, it 
is worth noting that most of the computation happens in the Matrix Multiply 
Unit (yellow). The basic idea behind the architecture under consideration is to 
maintain the mentioned unit busy as much as possible, trying to overlap the 
Matrix Multiplication operations execution with the one of other instructions. 
Inspecting more in detail the considered fundamental unit, it is possible to 
notice the presence of a Systolic execution (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5. “Systolic data flow of the Matrix Multiply Unit” [17] 
 
Data flow from the left, while weights are preloaded from the top: the multiply-
accumulate process transfers through the matrix as a diagonal wavefront. 
This architecture efficiently implements matrix multiplications and 
convolutions exploiting Systolic Arrays. Systolic Architecture studies can date 
back to the ‘80s [18], but are very efficient nowadays. More in details, a 
systolic architecture is made by a set of interconnected processing elements, but 
each of them is only able to communicate with its neighbours. In the case of 
DNNs, each processing element is only in charge to perform a multiply and 
accumulation (MAC) operation, before passing ahead the computed value. 
Therefore, data are streamed through the grid in a synchronized mode: in this 
way it is bypassed the need for computing and apply complex routing 
algorithms. Moreover, this architecture is able to provide energy efficiency, and 
this is due to the fact that reading’s cost of inputs from memory can be 
amortized over several cycles. 
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Figure 3.6. More detailed Matrix Multiplication Unit [10] 
 
In figure 3.6 it is shown the systolic array containing N x N MAC units, able to 
perform matrix multiplications and convolution operations [10].  
One advantage of this structure is that it is able to maximize the percentage of 
computing time to I/O operations’ time. Different layers are processed one at a 
time. Different kind of analysis that are detailed in [17], show that the 
bottlenecks that can happen can actually relate more to lack of memory 
bandwidth with respect to peak of computing. It is worth saying also that this 
chip was designed considering also some requirements related to response time, 
since it was employed in Natural Language Processing applications, that are 
actually end-user-facing services. The important fact is that it is reduced the 
dependency with the host CPU: the TPU is able to entirely sustain the whole 
execution of Neural Network models; this feature can be crucial in the sense 
that dividing tasks between different chips it can be easier to build reliable 
architecture, as a set of safe components. 
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3.3. Error Resilience Analysis 
 
Hanif et al. in [19] underline the essential necessity for an Error Resilience 
Analysis whose aim is to contextualize strength and weaknesses of a specific 
DNN. Therefore, based on this result, is it possible to apply the methodology 
described at the beginning of this chapter, but also to apply techniques, like 
pruning, whose purpose is to achieve an optimal gain in energy consumption or 
in execution time. Indeed, thanks to this kind of analysis it is possible to 
recognize probable candidates, ready to be modified (through suppression or 
optimization), without invalidating the global accuracy. The goal of the 
considered analysis is to examine the network resilience against errors of any 
sort. Thus, the authors divide the process in two steps: hardware level and 
software level error resilience analysis. For the purposes of the current work it 
is worth underlying the first approach. 
One key assumption, often made dealing with general errors, is to consider the 
errors as independent and identically distributed. Therefore, the addition of 
errors caused by multiple and independent faults, for a sufficient amount of 
errors, can be considered as a Gaussian distribution. Consequently, the main 
concept is to test the error resilience of a specific network by electrically 
introducing a White Gaussian Noise (0-mean, as shown in figure 3.7) in 
particular locations of the network, modifying nodes’ voltage. 
 
Figure 3.7. “White Gaussian Noise (WGN)” [19] 
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Specifically, the procedure establishes to insert WGN at the output of each layer 
of the network and to evaluate one by one the modification of the accuracy. 
This technique is emulating random hardware errors but also the effect of a 
reduced-precision computing aimed to reduce the computational complexity. 
The results of an exemplary analysis are shown in figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8. “Effects of introducing WGN at the output of different convolutional layers on the 
accuracy of the CNN” [19] 
 
As case study, Hanif et al. used a VGG-f network architecture, whose structure 
is primarily made by eight layers (five convolutional and three fully-connected), 
as shown in figure 3.9. It can be trained for classifying images. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. “VGG-f architecture. For illustrative purposes the activation, normalization, and 
pooling layers are not shown.” [19] 
 
The authors applied the analysis only to convolutional layers, since they are the 
most compute-intensive layers [19]. The important outcome is that, from this 
analysis, it is possible to identify the layers that shows more weaknesses. Based 
on these results it is now feasible to implement some countermeasures. 
43 
 
Moreover, they analyze also the consequences of the application of a non-0-
mean WGN, but the optimal behaviour of the network is found to be shown in 
the case of 0-mean, which is the most likely case in the real world. Results are 
shown in figure 3.10. 
 
Figure 3.10. “Effects of introducing bias + 20dBW WGN on the accuracy of the CNN” [19] 
 
 
3.4. Methodologies Reducing the Impact of Permanent 
Faults 
 
Nowadays, permanent faults can be identified through specific tests after 
manufacturing. Anyway, the process of discarding all the chips showing one or 
more permanent fault can be a remarkable reason for yield losses. Zhang et al. 
in [10] propose two post-manufacturing methodologies for fault-tolerant design 
against permanent faults, which are fault-aware. These solutions are based on 
the concept of pruning connections, which was demonstrated to little affect the 
accuracy of DNNs. The methodologies under considerations are applied to the 
Google TPU architecture, previously described, simply adding minor 
modifications as bypass circuitry. 
In the first works regarding systolic architectures from a fault-tolerant 
viewpoint the basic idea was to search for permanent fault and, once 
individuated, to simply deactivate the rows and columns of MAC units 
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containing faulty MAC. It was a very general solution conceived for each kind 
of application, nevertheless this solution was leading to important performances 
reduction.  
Both the solutions proposed in [10] start from the observation that each weight 
is statically mapped exactly into one MAC unit: the idea is to take advantage of 
this kind of mapping to state the rules of pruning. The first solution is called 
Fault-Aware Pruning (FAP) and it is illustrated in figure 3.11: 
 
Figure 3.11. FAP Illustration [10] 
 
Basically, given the information regarding (permanent) faulty MACs, coming 
from post-manufacturing tests, the main principle of FAP is to set to 0 (prune) 
each weight (or weights) which is mapped on a faulty MAC. The hardware 
bypassing circuitry is very simple, and it is exposed in figure 3.11. Obviously, 
this is representing an increasing in the area overhead, however it is estimated 
by Zhang et al. to be around the 9%, which can be acceptable. 
The second solution is named Fault-Aware Pruning + Retraining (FAP+T) 
and it adds a second step with respect to the previous one: after the pruning 
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operation, there is the retraining of the not-pruned weights of the network, while 
the pruned ones are required to be zero.  
 
Figure 3.12. FAP+T Algorithm [10] 
 
This operation allows an improvement of the classification accuracy, but it 
requires a specific retraining part for each TPU. Some results from their 
simulations are shown in the figure 3.13: 
 
Figure 3.13. “Classification accuracy vs. Percentage of Faulty MACs using FAP and FAP+T 
for MNIST and TIMIT and AlexNet.” [10] 
 
A limitation of this work is provided by Chitty-Venkata and Somani in [20], 
which argue that it is not very effective as a methodology in case of column 
faults, as shown in figures 3.14 and 3.15. 
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Figure 3.14. “Column Faults on Systolic Array” [20] 
 
 
Figure 3.15. “Effect of Pruning Weights at Column Fault Locations plus Retraining” [20] 
 
If a whole column is composed by faulty MACs, the result is a more dangerous 
situation with respect to the one that it is happening when there is an entire row 
made by faulty MACs. This is because pruning input neurons has little impact 
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with respect to the one made from an output node [20]. The idea exposed in this 
article is to apply some remapping techniques, as Matrix Transpose (for 
example in the case of low column faults to transform them in a low row faults) 
or Array Reduction (bypassing entire column through Matrix Transpose it was 
not possible to improve the accuracy, accepting a reduction in performance), 
avoiding to re-train the network. 
Referring to the study, of Bosio et al. in [14] it is possible to state that it is very 
difficult to give general results regarding the impact of permanent faults on 
DNN-based architectures. Every combination of DNN and the corresponding 
hardware supporting its execution should be analyzed in order to find the most 
critical elements. Nevertheless, a valuable result is related to the underlined 
criticality of exponent’s bits of the variables expressing the weights: since these 
bits are the most critical ones, one design solution could be to exploit 
redundancy applied only to the critical part of the system. 
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Chapter 4 
Transient Faults Mitigation 
 
In the fourth chapter of this thesis work there will be a description of the 
general impact of transient faults on DNN, then some innovative techniques to 
mitigate the impact of transient faults, firstly in Hardware Accelerators and then 
in Field Programmable Gate Arrays, followed by a brief observation about 
aging. 
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4.1. General Impact of Soft Errors on Deep Neural 
Networks 
 
Neggaz et al. in [13] analyze the effect of transient faults on the accuracy of 
DNN models for safety-critical systems. The study is conducted injecting 
logical bit flips and the choice of where to inject the fault is done based on an 
uniform distribution. The network chosen for the current task is LeNet5, whose 
architecture is basically made of two sections: a feature extractor, built with two 
convolutional layers and a classifier, developed with three fully connected 
layers followed by a SoftMax one. The dataset used to train the network is 
MNIST (handwritten digits to be recognized, divided in 10 classes). Then it is 
studied the accuracy after fault injection. Since the aim is to provide a complete 
analysis, the evaluation of the effects of transient faults is divided in two 
categories:  
• Errors affecting combinational circuits (called here Single Event 
Transient, SET): the impact is transient, indeed it is affecting once the 
specific current evaluation. To emulate this kind of errors in simulation, 
each transient event affects only the result of that given run. 
• Errors affecting storage in memory (named Single Event Upset, SEU): 
here a transient event succeeds in flipping a bit in memory, then the 
result is to have a corrupted data stored. To simulate this behaviour, it is 
considered the impact of consecutive transient events, causing bit flips in 
turn, that should be seen by successive evaluations. 
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Figure 4.1. “Comparison between single and multiple event transients and their impact on 
overall network performance.” [13] 
 
 
In figure 4.1 it is shown the behaviour of the accuracy while rising the fault 
injection probability, in case of SET. The first observation that comes out is that 
the impact of injecting multiple errors on the drop in accuracy is more 
important with respect to the case of single error injection. Moreover, the 
accuracy starts to drop from a fault injection probability of 10-2, but it is 
possible to notice that the global loss is still acceptable, and this is due to some 
natural DNN properties that make them strong with respect to SET [13]. 
Concerning the case of SEU, the cumulative factor of multiple errors in storage 
comes out and then its impact is more significant. 
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Figure 4.2. “Evolution of average accuracy (in black) when the number of errors augments. 
The dispersion and the extreme cases are shown in red and gray respectively.” [13] 
 
In figure 4.2 it is shown the impact of memory errors, which are translated in 
modifications of weights, on the accuracy of the network. It is worth noting that 
in the worst-case scenario the network becomes almost a random number 
producer, obviously violating safety requirements. Anyway, before 10 errors the 
network is still working properly. 
Hence, this analysis is remarking that errors introduced in combinational 
circuits have a relatively small impact, and their effect is mitigated naturally 
from the network, while errors happening in memories have a bigger impact on 
network accuracy. 
 
4.2. General Impact of Soft Errors in Hardware 
Accelerators 
 
Li et al. in [21] highlight the different parameters that should be considered 
while searching for impact and consequences of soft errors in Hardware 
Accelerators: 
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• Topology and Data Type: the topology of the specific network under 
consideration should be carefully evaluated, since it is one major player 
in propagation of errors. Additionally, distinct data types can be 
differently affected by errors.  
• Bit Position and Value: this parameter is strictly related to the data type, 
indeed it is possible to find more vulnerable bits depending on their 
location, and therefore it is possible to better protect them. One example 
here is the difference in relevance between an exponent’s bit and a 
mantissa’s one. 
• Layers: errors happening in some layers can be more critical than bit 
flips occurring in other ones. 
• Data Reuse: the last parameter is taking into account the fact that there 
are some computations that are made once and then reused, like weights. 
The criticality of an error can depend on the reuse factor of the word 
containing that fault. 
 
4.3. Methodologies Reducing Impact of Transient Faults 
on DNNs’ Accelerators 
 
Li et al. in [21] continue proposing an interesting mitigation methodology for 
transient faults happening in DNNs accelerators. The analysis is started by 
excluding combinational logic’s faults since they are usually much less critical 
with respect to memory components. Then given the nature of the accelerators, 
also it is omitted the contribute of errors in control logic units (that occupy only 
a very small part in accelerators). The method is called Symptom-Based Error 
Detectors (SED), and it is implemented via software. The mentioned technique 
monitors value ranges of the activation functions, and they are judged as 
symptoms to detect the possible faults: the idea justifying it is that if the output 
of an activation function acquires an high magnitude due to an error, it is very 
likely to obtain a Silent Data Corruption (SDC) at the output. The monitoring 
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task is assigned to a properly trained neural network, which is trained on a 
faulty-free operation to learn to judge the right ranges for the output of the 
activation functions. Then once trained, the detector can be implemented and 
executed asynchronously with respect to the nominal operation to check the 
ranges. As a result, the average precision obtained from experiments is 90,21% 
and the average recall is 92,5%.  
Based on the Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) philosophy, firstly 
introduced in the 1980s by Huang and Abraham [22], Dos Santos et al. in [23] 
propose a strategy to reduce the impact of transient faults in GPU-based safety-
critical systems. The core idea of ABFT strategies is to study the algorithm 
structure searching for a smart and effective way to reinforce it. 
In this case the main concept is to encode the input data, to adjust the algorithm 
to work with these data and to introduce a check phase in the output to benefit 
from the encoding. In the case in which an error is detected, if there is much 
information, it can be corrected, otherwise the computation is stopped and re-
launched. Basically, it is an extension of the ECC-based techniques to cases in 
which it is required computation and not just transfer of data. 
The case in which faults happen at the beginning of the network, affecting the 
initial layers, could be one of the most dangerous because of the fact that errors 
can propagate in an uncontrolled way to the following layers. 
Concerning the case under consideration in this paragraph, the idea is to 
strengthen the matrix multiplication operations, which are of crucial importance 
when running DNN-based algorithms. The methodology is shown in figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. “Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance for matrix multiplication” [23] 
 
This algorithm comes from an adaptation suitable for DNNs from a more 
general algorithm presented by Rech et al. in [16]. Basically, input matrices are 
encoded before the actual operation, adding a row and a column checksum 
vector, evaluated as the ordered list of sums of the items present in the 
correspondent column or row. The original algorithm [16] planned to increase 
by one the number of row and columns, implementing the check row and 
column, to not lose accuracy. In this case the authors decided to replace one 
column and one row of the original matrix with the check vectors because when 
dealing with a specific hardware like GPUs, specific accelerators or FPGAs, 
they are specifically tuned on the dimension of the final application matrices. 
Thus, this choice is based on the desire to not increment too much the execution 
time. The price to pay is related to a decreased detection accuracy, that anyway 
it is proven to be sufficiently high to meet the standard requirements. 
Then, once the computation is completed, the check vectors are re-evaluated in 
a separate calculation, and then it happens the comparison. In this particular 
case if it is detected only one error (mismatch) it is possible to correct it, 
otherwise a re-evaluation is required. This theory is aligned with the principal 
assumption that is at the fundamentals of the reliability theory that is that faults 
happen once at a time. The aforementioned result can be easily implemented to 
reduce the impact of soft errors in the field. 
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4.4. Selective Hardening on FPGA 
 
An important category of chips which is promising to efficiently and safely 
implement DNNs based algorithms is the one represented by Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA). It is possible to underline, among others, 
some key characteristics of these circuits, like their affordability, low-power 
consumption and flexibility. The typical FPGA structure is suitable for the 
execution of parallel tasks. On the other hand, FPGAs are particularly 
vulnerable to radiation-induced errors, leading to critical consequences: more 
precisely if the transient error happens in the Static Random Access Memory 
(SRAM) in which it is stored the map of active routing connections, it is 
possible that the outcome is a modification of the configuration of some internal 
block (i.e. a Lookup Table (LUT) or a Block RAM (BRAM)). 
Libano et al. in [24] propose an innovative reliability analysis of Neural 
Networks algorithms implemented through FPGAs. They start emphasizing 
some remarks similar to the ones found in every work evaluated by this thesis. 
The important preliminary statement declares that, given the innate nature of 
neural networks, not all the errors affecting the output are able to generate a 
meaningful impact on the execution. Thus, the error criticality is split in two 
categories for this study:  
• Tolerable error: the output of the network is faulty but the behaviour is 
correct, meaning that the classification mechanism is concluded 
correctly; 
• Critical error: output errors are severe enough to lead to 
misclassifications. 
The research begins from an assessment on reliability of two different neural 
networks, whose training phase was performed in a faulty-free manner. The two 
networks under consideration are the Iris Flower ANN, composed by only two 
fully connected layers, and the MNIST CNN, made by 8 different layers 
(Convolutional, Pooling, ReLU and Inner Product ones). The main reason for 
this choice is that the case studies are hardly different between each other but 
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they share the improvement of reliability following the same trend: thus the 
approach proposed can be fairly generic. 
The experiments are made as radiation beam bombardments, following the 
framework described in chapter 2. 
The methodology proposed by Libano et al. in [24] is called Selective 
Hardening. A very effective solution would be the Triple Modular Redundancy 
(TMR) applied to the whole FPGA circuit: the problem is the scarcity of 
resources to actually implement it, and also the significant overhead introduced 
by this technique in terms of area and power consumption. Here the idea is to 
reinforce only the layers in the network that, if corrupted, are likely causing 
critical errors. 
Hence, a preliminary fault-injection campaign (software-based) was performed 
to identify the critical layers of the two networks under test. It was found that in 
general the first layers are more vulnerable because there is more room for a 
fault to propagate. Nevertheless, each network should be carefully analyzed: the 
sensitivity of layers depends on the topology. In the current case study the most 
critical layers are found as the hidden layer of the Iris Flower ANN and the last 
layer (Inner Product) of the MNIST CNN. 
Thereafter, the radiation experiments were performed. There are four situations 
of chips that are compared: Unhardened (without protection), Selective TMR 
(protecting only the most critical layer) and Full TMR (in the cases of Hardware 
and Software voter). The results are presented in figures 4.4 - 4.5 - 4.6 - 4.7. 
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Figure 4.4. “FIT rate of the Iris Flower ANN using four different hardening configurations.” 
[24] 
 
 
Figure 4.5. “Percentage of the masked faults divided by resource utilization of the four 
different hardening configurations of the Iris Flower ANN.” [24] 
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Figure 4.6. “FIT rate of the MNIST CNN using three different hardening configurations.” 
[24] 
 
Figure 4.7. “Percentage of the masked faults divided by resource utilization of the three 
different hardening configurations of the MNIST CNN.” [24] 
 
Generally, it is worth noting that the majority of errors are tolerable. Then, the 
full TMR is more effective than the selective one in terms of percentage of 
errors, while it is less efficient since it needs a lot of resources to be sustained. 
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Hence, Selective Hardening technique is found to be a good trade off between 
the resource utilization and the percentage of the errors. From the graphs it is 
possible also to notice that it was not possible to implement the full TMR in 
MNIST CNN because of the lack of resources, and this fact emphasize the 
necessity of smartly protect only the most vulnerable parts of the network.  
Finally, a possible improvement of this technique can be to iteratively apply this 
approach, protecting not only the most vulnerable layer but also the second, the 
third and so on, up to reach the target reliability. 
 
4.5. Brief Observation on Aging 
 
There exist two main aging phenomena that can have a considerable effect on 
the transistors of a chip: Hot Carrier Injection (HCI), mostly affecting NMOS 
devices, and Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI), impacting mainly 
PMOS transistors. Both stated phenomena result in an increase of the MOS 
transistors’ threshold voltage. This leads to a reduction of the drive current and 
then to an increment of the propagation delay around computation’s paths. 
Consequently, the values whose evaluation comes from critical paths are 
frequently affected by aging; unfortunately, often the critical paths are used in 
the evaluation of significant bits in the intermediate products and this translates 
into considerable errors (i.e. considering the two’s complement number 
representation, errors in higher order position can produce huge changes). 
Anyway, the effect of aging can be very different studying distinct instances, 
even when taking into account the same category of gates, but also the way 
gates are affected by these phenomena is related to their own stress condition 
(related to their actual switching activity). Another point to be evaluated is that 
aging is basically unavoidable, after a certain time of the operation of the chip 
in the field, and also that it is not possible to “reset” to its initial performances 
an aged transistor. 
Given these facts, Liu and Chang in [25] explore the impact of circuit Aging on 
DNNs-based accelerators, evaluating the degradation of the accuracy that this 
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phenomenon is able to cause. In this study it is simulated the aging on MAC 
units, along days, months and years of operation and essentially in simulations 
they are used models for degraded MOS transistors. The neural network used 
here is AlexNet. 
Observing the results, it is possible to provide an operative solution in order to 
prevent the effects on accuracy of the aging phenomenon.  
 
Figure 4.8. Aging simulation and evaluation [25] 
 
In the first graph of figure 4.8, dashed lines characterize results related to single 
layers for which the input presented at each layer is correct and not influenced 
by previous stages. In this case, it is possible to notice that in the worst situation 
is related to the final layer, while the others’ accuracy is essentially not affected. 
Instead, solid lines consider the situation in which it is enabled the propagation 
of errors, due to aging phenomena, through different layers. Here, the whole 
calculation suffers bigger accuracy reduction, and this can be easily 
reconducted to the fact that, in the considered situation, errors are propagating. 
61 
 
Generally, the rapid degradation of the accuracy in the final layer witnesses the 
fact that networks made by an high number of layers can be more vulnerable to 
aging phenomena. A solution comes out from the work of Liu and Chang: 
observing the simulation results reported in the second graph of figure 4.8, 
relaxing the nominal frequency of operation of the entire chip operation (920 
MHz in the current case) by 10-20 MHz can significantly improve the 
robustness of the chip to aging phenomena. This is due to the fact that relaxing 
frequency there is more space for critical paths, and now they are able to mask 
the delay errors caused by aging.  
 
 
Figure 4.9. Liu and Wang simulations  [25] 
 
In the first graph of figure 4.9, there is the representation of the accuracy 
degradation of the first and fifth convolutional layer of AlexNet, due to aging 
phenomena. These results are coherent with the previous ones, stating that the 
final layer is suffering much more with respect to the first one. A curious 
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phenomenon that can be observed by this simulation is the fact that the 
accuracy of the fifth layer starts to recover after one years, and this is caused by 
the flipping of several internal signals and then it is increased the probability of 
accidentally correct errors. Clearly, referring to safety-critical applications, this 
totally unpredictable situation must definitely be avoided. In the second chart of 
figure 4.9, there is another confirmation of the conclusions of the study; indeed 
relaxing the operating frequency, chips can maintain longer their nominal 
performances. 
Hence, device aging can result in a substantial accuracy drop after one year of 
deployment, and different layers have different sensitivities to this kind of 
phenomena. 
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Conclusions 
 
This work presents an exploration of the adoption of Deep Neural Networks in 
Safety-Critical Systems. It was made an accurate bibliographic research about 
requirements that should be respected, about the main procedures to evaluate 
the reliability of systems to be compliant with standards, about the effects of the 
principal faults on Deep Neural Networks operation when implemented in 
different hardware architectures, and about some innovative methodologies and 
techniques that can be implemented to improve the reliability of such systems. 
Challenges and risks related to the employment of DNNs in Computer Vision 
for Autonomous Driving are identified and analyzed, through a collection of 
state-of-the-art approaches, strategies and practices.  
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Abbreviations 
 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
ABFT Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance 
ASIL Automotive Safety Integrity Level 
BRAM Block Random Access Memory 
CNN Convolutional Neural Networks 
DUE Detected Uncoverable Error 
DNN Deep Neural Network 
E/E Electrical and Electronic 
FAP Fault-Aware Pruning 
FAP+T Fault-Aware Pruning + Retraining 
FIT Failures In Time 
FN False Negative 
FP False Positive 
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array 
GPU Graphic Processing Unit 
HCI Hot Carrier Injection  
IoU Intersection over Union 
LFM Latent Faults Metric 
LUT Lookup Table 
MAC Multiply and Accumulation 
ML Machine Learning 
NBTI Negative Bias Temperature Instability 
NN Neural Network 
OOD Out-of-Distribution 
66 
 
PFH Probability of Dangerous Failure per Hour 
QM Quality Management 
SED Symptom-Based Error Detectors 
SET Single Event Transient 
SEU Single Event Upset 
SDC Silent Data Corruption 
SM Streaming Multiprocessor 
SPFM Single Point Faults Metric 
SRAM Static Random Access Memory 
TMR Triple Modular Redundancy 
TN True Negative 
TP True Positive 
TPU Tensor Processing Unit 
WGN White Gaussian Noise 
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